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A TIME TO ACT ANEW: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
ON THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005 AND THE
CHANGING ELECTRICAL ENERGY MARKET
BRAD SHERMAN*
The dogmas of the quiet past, are inadequate to the stormy
present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we
must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must
think anew, and act anew.
-Abraham Lincoln1
Mr. Speaker, this is an energy bill for 1950, not 2050. It
would have been difficult to support this outmoded policy
decades ago, and I certainly cannot vote for it today.
-Congresswoman Betty McCollum2
On August 8, 2005, President Bush noted that, "[flor more than a
decade, America has gone without a national energy policy."3 President
Bush made this statement at the signing of the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
an Act that in the President's words "promotes dependable, affordable,
and environmentally sound production and distribution of energy for
America's future."4 Why then, after more than a decade without such a
policy, did Congress and the President decide that 2005 was the time to
enact the Energy Policy Act? In his speech President Bush explained that,
"electricity bills are going up. We had a massive blackout two summers
ago that cost this country billions of dollars and disrupted millions of
* Brad Sherman is a 2007 J.D. candidate at the William & Mary School of Law. He
received a B.A. in History, with Honors, from the University of Kansas in 2004. The
author would like to thank the editorial staff for their assistance, his parents for their
encouragement, his friends for their unique brand of support, and Amy Hammontree for
bearing with him during the entire process.
1 Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862), in 5 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINcOLN 518, 537 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
2 151 CONG. REC. E1759 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2005) (statement of Rep. McCollum).
' President George W. Bush, Address at the Signing of the Energy Policy Act of 2005
(Aug. 8, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050808-6.html.
4 Press Release, President George W. Bush, President's Statement on Energy Policy Act of
2005 (Aug. 8, 2005), http'J/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050808-9.html.
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lives."5 Other reasons include the fact that the United States recently
"had an attack on [its] homeland"6 and has a growing need "to keep the
lights running while protecting the environment. . . ."' More precisely,
we need an energy policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century
because "contemporary energy policy discussions involve fundamental
concerns of a different kind from those that occupied most of the twen-
tieth century .... By way of shorthand, energy policy today must address
energy, the environment, and security."8
The remaining question is whether the Energy Policy Act of 2005
effectively deals with the energy concerns of the twenty-first century.
The answer to this question lies in a historical understanding of energy
use in the United States; only from this historical basis can a true under-
standing of the United States' future energy needs emerge. This Note
suggests that the United States has historically followed a policy of de-
pending primarily on fossil fuels for energy production.9 In the past, this
policy made sense for the United States, but given changing economic,
environmental, and security concerns, this no longer holds true.'0 Unfor-
tunately, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 remains trapped in the twentieth
century approaches to energy policy and does not adequately address the
energy concerns of the twenty-first century. 1
I. HISTORICAL ENERGY USE IN THE UNITED STATES
Since the Industrial Revolution, the United States has depended
heavily on the use of fossil fuels to meet its energy needs. 12 However,
which fossil fuel the United States has focused on at any particular time
has varied over the years. 3 The variations have depended on "shifts in
their availability, movements in their comparative prices, advances in
technology, changes in the structure of the nation's output of goods and
' Bush, supra note 3.
6Id.
7 Id.
'See Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Rethinking Reform of Electricity Markets,
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 516 (2005).
9 See infra Part I.
'0 See infra Parts II-III.
" See infra Parts IV-V.
12 See SAM H. SCHURR ET AL., ENERGY IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, 1850-1975: AN
ECONOMIC STUDY OF ITS HISTORY AND PROSPECTS 28 (1977).
13 Id. at 31-34.
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services, and shifts in consumer preference."'4 As a result of these forces,
the United States has used either coal, oil, or gas as its primary energy
source at different times during the last 140 years.' 5
During the years from 1850 to 1910, the percentage of energy pro-
duction from coal increased from nine percent to seventy-seven percent.16
This dramatic increase in the use of coal occurred for a number of reasons. 7
In particular, coal use grew due to a large increase in the production of
iron and steel, its developing use as fuel for the railroads, a growing eco-
nomy with increased manufacturing, the advent of electric power pro-
duction, and its natural abundance.'" However, after World War I the use
of coal relative to the use of oil and gas declined greatly. 9 By 1955 oil
and gas accounted for nearly two-thirds of the total energy supply.2° This
relative rise in the importance of gas and oil stemmed from an increased
demand for petroleum as a source of artificial light, a need for lubricants
in factories and railroads, the huge increase in the use of automobiles,
the minimal processing natural gas requires, and the abundance of
natural gas as a cheap source of energy.2' Oil and gas, along with coal,
would retain this dominant position for many years.22 Other than some
development of nuclear power under President Eisenhower (more for
military than energy reasons), the domestic energy market would not
look far beyond fossil fuels until the 1970s.23 Vito Stagliano, former
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for Policy Analysis in the first
Bush Administration, explains:
There was in fact no obvious reason to embark upon energy
policy initiatives during the early 1960s. Composite fuel
oil prices had been in decline since 1953, domestic oil re-
serve estimates were up, as was production, and natural
gas proven reserves were increasing even in the face of
counterproductive regulation.24
14 Id. at 34.
5 Id. at 33-42.
16 Id. at 38.
17 Id. at 66-70.
18/d.
19 Id. at 35.
20 Id.
21Id. at 85-118, 132-33.
12 Id. at 237.
23 See infra Part II.
24VITO STAGLIANO, A POLICY OF DISCONTENT: THE MAKING OF A NATIONAL ENERGY
STRATEGY 17 (2001).
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Not until the first energy crisis in 1973 would policymakers have a
reason to rethink the United States' heavy dependence on fossil fuels.25
Several factors led to the first United States energy crisis, includ-
ing a rise in energy consumption, over-dependence on oil and natural gas,
a decline in domestic production of natural gas and oil, nationalization of
Middle Eastern oil fields, the emergence of OPEC, environmental regu-
lations that made some technologies uncompetitive, and uncertainty about
the future of nuclear energy. When the Organization of Arab Petroleum
Exporting Countries placed an embargo on the United States in retaliation
for its support of Israel in the second Arab-Israeli war,27 these changes in
the energy market resulted in an energy crisis.28 Oil prices quadrupled
and President Nixon began to question the United States' lack of energy
independence.29 To alleviate the crisis, President Nixon initiated the first
of what would be many policies meant to address our energy needs.3"
Unfortunately, after many attempts at change, little optimism
existed about the U.S. energy market at the beginning of the twenty-first
Century." The Economist summarized the situation accurately when it
stated: "RUinlike other countries that are modernising their power in-
dustries successfully, America is muddling along with an approach to
electricity reform that is deeply flawed."32 In the last thirty years, new
economic, environmental, and security concerns have fundamentally
" James L. Sweeney, Four More Years: An Energy Policy for The Twenty-First Century,
HOOVER DIG. No. 1, 2005, http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/2993911.html.26 CHARLES E. BROWN, WORLD ENERGY RESOURCES 225 (2002).
27 See STAGLIANO, supra note 24, at 23.
28 See BROWN, supra note 26, at 225.
29 See STAGLIANO, supra note 24, at 24.
30 Id. at 20. President Nixon attempted to increase supplies and curb demand without
regard for the environmental impacts of his actions. Id. President Ford tried to increase
government control of the energy market while President Carter created the Department
of Energy to oversee the markets and ensure increased efficiency, more domestic energy
production (from coal), and the use of some renewable energies (namely solar power). Id.
at 27-30, 38-39. President Reagan took the opposite approach and determined to leave
our energy markets under the control of market forces, not regulation, in order to secure
a workable energy policy. Id. at 43-46. However, the domestic oil market crash of 1986
brought these plans to an end. Id. at 58. To all the traditional steps of increased domestic
production, improved efficiency, and regulation of the market, George H. W. Bush added
legislation that allowed competition to the existing electric utilities in the hopes of
restructuring the electric markets. Id. at 339. The Clinton Administration undertook no
significant energy policy actions. See id. at 429-30.
" Bring Me Your Powerless Masses, ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 2003, available at http://www
.economist.com/printedition/displayStory.cfm?StoryID=2003548.
32 Id.
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changed the energy market.33 The United States has been unable or un-
willing to adapt its policy approach to electricity reform to address these
new concerns.
II. CHANGES IN THE ENERGY MARKET
At the beginning of the twenty-first century new energy chal-
lenges have made the energy policies of the twentieth century ineffec-
tive.34 For the United States to effectively deal with these new concerns,
a historical understanding of their causes is imperative.
A. Traditional Economic Theories About the Energy Market
Three ideas dominated economic thinking about energy markets
in the twentieth century: economies of scale, natural monopolies, and gov-
ernment regulation. Economists define economies of scale as a decline in
the average cost of production as more units are produced. 35 Thus, in the
energy market, "economies of scale made it cost-effective to install larger
central power plants" because the generation of large amounts of elec-
tricity reduced its average cost per unit.36 The early years of the electric
power industry were marked by many small electricity producers merg-
ing together to take advantage of the lower costs offered by economies
of scale. 7 As the number of electric utilities decreased, the remaining
utilities began to operate as natural monopolies.3" The theory of a natural
monopoly states that a single producer can more effectively realize eco-
nomies of scale by avoiding the duplicate costs of infrastructure that are
inherent with competing firms. 39 The United States Supreme Court rec-
ognized the theory of a natural monopoly in the case of Munn v. Illinois,'
and created the proposition that a monopoly that affects the public good
can be regulated by the government.4 ' Regulation, along with economy
33 See infra at Part II.B-D.
' See Sweeney, supra note 25, at 1.
35 RAPHAEL EDINGER & SANJAY KAuL, RENEWABLE RESOURCES FOR ELECTRIC POWER:
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 10 (2000).
3Id. at 10.37 Id. at 11.
38Id. at 12.
31 See Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 8, at 505.
40 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
4' Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 8, at 507.
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of scale and the natural monopoly, became a pillar of the United States'
energy market.
Historically, using economies of scale as a theoretical underpin-
ning of the U.S. energy market made sense. From the inception of the elec-
tricity market until the 1980s, average costs decreased as the number of
customers and the size of plants grew. 42 From 1902 to 1932, electric com-
panies increased the size of their turbines to reduce heat costs by approxi-
mately eighty percent. 43 "The number of electric customers quadrupled
between 1925 and 1970, while plant capacity increased thirteenfold and
electric sales multiplied by a factor of 25."4 As a result, prices dropped
from ten cents per kilowatt-hour ("kWh") to 2.6 cents per kWh from 1906
to 1970.' Given the advantages offered by economies of scale, many power
companies merged early in the twentieth century.46 As competing com-
panies merged, the efficiency provided by economies of scale and the high
cost of entering the market discouraged competition and made the re-
maining companies natural monopolies .47 Governments usually regulate
natural monopolies to protect customers from price abuse,' and com-
panies that generated electric power exhibited monopolistic tendencies
and affected the public good.49 As a result, the United States government
regulated the industry to avoid monopolistic abuse of consumers.5 0
In the words of Sidney A. Shapiro and Joseph P. Tomain:
The regulatory response was to impose a government-
sanctioned monopoly on that single provider through what
has come to be known as the regulatory compact. The terms
of the compact are fairly simple. An electric utility is given
an exclusive franchise area and is obligated to provide
42 See EDINGER & KAUL, supra note 35, at 10.
43Id. at 11.
4Id. at 12.
4Id.
4Id. at 11 ("In the late 1920s, the 16 largest electric power holding companies controlled
over 75 percent of all U.S. electric power generation.").
47Heather N. Jarvis, Keeping the Lights On-At All Costs?Imploring Consistent Prudence
Review and a Prudence Standard That Includes Demand Response and Responsible
Portfolio Management, 29 VT. L. REV. 1037, 1038-1039 (2005).
48 Id. at 1039.
41 See id. at 1037. The Supreme Court, in Munn v Illinois, held that an industry is subject
to price regulation when it exhibits monopolistic tendencies and affects the public good.
Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 8, at 507.
o Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 8, at 507.
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service within that franchise area. The government, to
counteract monopolistic pricing, is then given ratemaking
authority over the electric utility. Ratemaking is a short-
hand way of saying that the government controls utility
prices and profits.5'
This system works well for providing inexpensive power as long as the
market is growing and thus economies of scale are still available for new
centralized power plants.5 2 The United States effectively regulated nat-
ural monopolies in the electric power industry, created when companies
took advantage of economies of scale, until the 1970s. 3
B. Economic Changes in the Traditional Energy Market
Two factors began to change the energy market starting in the
1960s.54 First, the growth of the U.S. energy market slowed during the
1960s.55 Second, improvements in the efficiency of small gas turbines
(and increasingly, renewable energy sources) made smaller generators
more cost efficient.56 The slow growing energy market meant that new
large power plants could not recover their construction costs quickly be-
cause there was no immediate demand for the excess electricity they
produced.57 This fact, coupled with the increased efficiency of smaller
51 Id. at 507-08.
52 Id. at 513.
63 Id.
See id. at 513; see also EDINGER & KAUL, supra note 35, at 75.
5 Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 8, at 513.
See EDINGER & KAUL, supra note 35, at 75; see also ELECTRIC MKT. ASSESSMENT TEAM,
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY
2000: AN UPDATE, at ch. 5 (2000), http'//www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg-struupdate/
chapterS.html [hereinafter THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY].
Restructuring has been sustained primarily by technological improve-
ments in gas turbines. "In areas with cheap... natural gas-most
notably the United States-gas turbines [are] the least cost option [for
new electricity generating capacity]." These improvements also have
recast economies of scale in electric power generation technologies. No
longer is it necessary to build a 1,000-megawatt generating plant to
exploit economies of scale. Combined-cycle gas turbines reach maxi-
mum efficiency at 400 megawatts, while aero-derivative gas turbines
can be efficient at scales as small as 10 megawatts.
Id. (quoting H.R. Linden, The Revolution Continues, ELECTRICITY J., Dec. 1995, at 54).
57 EDINGER & KAUL, supra note 35, at 78.
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generators, meant that smaller power plants began to make more economic
sense for power companies than larger plants.58 In short, economies of
scale ceased to apply to producers of energy in the United States.
When economies of scale no longer apply, the average cost of each
unit of electricity begins to rise.59 During the 1970s, the energy crisis, high
inflation, increasing capital costs, and environmental regulations also added
to the costs of producing electricity.60 "Between 1974 and 1984, the average
price of electricity in the United States increased by approximately 250
percent."6 ' As costs to the electric industry grew, electric producers passed
these costs on to consumers in the form of higher rates.62 As electric rates
increased, so did the political pressure to address the problem.' In response
to these political pressures, state and federal governments have taken
tentative steps toward deregulating the electricity market."
In 1978, Congress passed the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies
Act ("PURPA") which brought a small measure of competition into the elec-
tricity market.65 PURPA allows certain nonutility producers of electricity
to enter the wholesale market6 6 by selling power to utility companies.67
Congress took this a step further in 1992 by enacting the Energy Policy
Act of 1992, which allowed non-regulated electricity producers to enter
58 Id. at 75-79.
59 Id. at 11.
'0 Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 8, at 513.
"' Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the Electricity Market,
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 454 (2005).
62 Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 8, at 513.
63Id.
As noted, the electric industry, as traditionally structured and regu-
lated, works well as long as the industry is expanding. Once, however,
costs rise because of either reaching a technological plateau or reaching
capacity, then the market can become distorted and inefficient. Con-
sumers can consequently suffer because they are paying higher than
efficient rates for electricity. The electricity industry experienced
exactly this confluence of events. In brief, utilities had accumulated
excess capacity, had built expensive plants, and . . . were charging
consumers for those additional costs. These events combined to put
significant pressures on politicians and regulators to address rising
electricity rates.
Id.
" Like a Candle in the Wind, ECONOMIST, Oct. 4-10, 2003, at 58-59.6 5 THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY, supra note 56, at ch. 4.
6 In the wholesale electricity market producers of electricity sell their power to the elec-
tric companies who then provide that power to the end consumer. See id.67 /d.
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the wholesale market and sell their power at market prices.68 With new
competitors in the market, generation of electricity no longer qualifies
as a natural monopoly.69 Instead, only transmission and distribution re-
main natural monopolies, since they would have duplicate and unneces-
sary components if they competed.7" The wholesale market has grown
quickly under these acts, and now "over half the electricity generated is
exchanged first on the wholesale market."7 The years since 1992 have
seen mixed efforts to bring more competition into the electricity market
as both the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and many of the
states have enacted varied and even contradictory laws designed to bring
about deregulation."
Slowing growth in the energy market, greater efficiencies of small
generators, and tentative steps towards the introduction of market forces
have changed traditional economic thought about the energy market. As
the three economic pillars of the historical energy market-economies of
scale, natural monopolies, and regulation-begin to crumble, other factors
are also changing the energy market. Chief among these are worries about
securing the energy market from terrorist threats and growing concerns
about the environmental costs of fossil fuels.7"
C. Security Changes
As Professor Steven Ferrey observes, "[centralized infrastructure
is vulnerable. Whether by supply shortage, transmission system fault
or terrorist attack, our current centralized electric supply and distribution
system is remarkably fragile and vulnerable."74 Currently, the United
States operates a very centralized grid system.75 Only three major
networks, composed of connections between individual utilities, cover the
6 Id.
" David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory vs. Practice, 40 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 417, 422 (2005).
70 Id.
71 Joel B. Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and Retrenchment
in Electric Utility Deregulation, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 545, 550 (2005).72 Id. at 545-59.
71 Steven Ferrey, Power Future, 15 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 261, 272-78 (2005).74 Id. at 275.
75See id.; EDINGER & KAUL, supra note 35, at 124-25.
2006] 219
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
entire United States. 6 Recent events have shown both the fragility and
the vulnerability of the highly centralized United States grid.
The New York blackout of summer 2003 showed both the reality
of severe transmission problems and the high costs that result from trans-
mission difficulties.77 Problems transmitting electricity in Ohio caused
fifty million people to lose power as over two hundred power plants went
off-line.7" This power outage only lasted for a single day, but still cost
American businesses approximately $6 billion.79 Other recent blackouts
in California have also cost its economy billions of dollars.80 As these
blackouts have shown the ease with which the United States' centralized
grid can be disrupted, fears have grown that terrorists or other states may
attack our power grid or the plants connected to it."' In fact, a report from
the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research found that the
threat of an attack against our energy infrastructure has been recog-
nized by FEMA since 1980.82 An attack resulting in a permanent physical
disruption of the grid would create a much more serious economic impact
than the blackouts in New York and California because electricity cannot
be stored and few substitutes for generation exist.8 3 Given the realistic
possibility of an attack against our centralized grid and the huge eco-
nomic losses that would result from such an attack, this threat has also
played a role in changing the energy market.
76 EDINGER & KAUL, supra note 35, at 124.
The Eastern Interconnected System covers the eastern two-thirds of
the United States. The Western Interconnected System consists of the
Southwest and areas west of the Rocky Mountains. While these first
two networks are interconnected, the third electricity network, the Texas
Interconnected System, is not connected to them except by certain
direct current lines.
Id.
" Ferrey, supra note 73, at 276-77.78 Id. at 277.
79 Id.
0 Id.
81 Id. at 275.
82 ARJUN MAKHIJANI, INST. FOR ENERGY AND ENvTL. RESEARCH, SECURING THE ENERGY
FUTURE OF THE UNITED STATES: OIL, NUCLEAR, AND ELECTRICITY VULNERABILITIES AND
A POST-SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ROADMAP FOR ACTION, at ch. 2 (2001), http://www.ieer.org/
reports/energy/bushch2.html.
8 id.
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D. Environmental Changes
Finally, concerns about the rising environmental costs of using
fossil fuels have also played a role in changing the traditional energy
market of the United States.' Over the last century average global sur-
face temperatures have increased by up to one degree Fahrenheit."5 At
nearly the same time greenhouse gas emissions, which trap heat within
the Earth's atmosphere, have increased due to the combustion of fossil
fuels.86 Concentrations of carbon dioxide have grown by almost thirty
percent, concentrations of methane have almost doubled, and nitrous
oxide concentrations have grown by approximately fifteen percent since
the beginning of the industrial revolution.87 Scientists agree that these
changes have taken place in the atmosphere. 8 Many scientists also
think these rising levels of greenhouse gases have contributed to global
warming.89 Scientific uncertainty exists as to what extent increased
greenhouse gas emissions have caused global warming and what future
threats global warming may pose.9 ° Many scientists also fear that global
warming will result in large environmental and social costs.9'
Some of these costs include glacial and sea ice retreat, thawing of
permafrost, and a general shifting of patterns among the weather, oceans,
8 See Ferrey, supra note 73, at 272; see also INT'L CLIMATE CHANGE TASKFORCE, MEETING
THE CLIMATE CHALLENGE (2005), http/www.americanprogress.org/kf/climatechallenge.pdf
[hereinafter MEETING THE CLIMATE CHALLENGE]; Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 8, at 513.
5 Environmental Protection Agency, Global Warming: Climate, http://yosemite.epa.gov/
oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/climate.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
86/d.
87 id.
8 8 id.
89 id.
9 Id.
91 MEETING THE CLIMATE CHALLENGE, supra note 84, at 1.
The cost of failing to mobilise in the face of this threat is likely to be
extremely high. The economic costs alone will be very large: as extreme
weather events such as droughts and floods become more destructive and
frequent; communities, cities, and island nations are damaged or inun-
dated as sea level rises; and agricultural output is disrupted. The social
and human costs are likely to be even greater, encompassing mass loss
of life, the spread or exacerbation of diseases, dislocation of populations,
geopolitical instability, and a pronounced decrease in the quality of life.
Impacts on ecosystems and biodiversity are also likely to be devastating.
Id. (citation omitted).
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and atmosphere.92 Depending on how these damages are measured and
the amount of future emissions, the economic costs of global warming
could total 2.5 percent. of the global Gross Domestic Product.93 In terms
of how these costs would affect the United States, the Environmental
Protection Agency has estimated that:
Around a quarter of the total economic damage would fall
on farmers, who could no longer use some lands. Around a
sixth of the total cost would come in the form of increased
cooling costs for homes and offices (net of the reduced costs
of heating). Rising sea levels, damage to drinking-water
supplies and heatwaves would each account for 10%. De-
forestation and rising ozone pollution together would add
another 10%. And the economic estimates exclude the
"amenity value"-the price people would be willing to pay
to avoid rising temperatures for reasons of convenience.94
Such estimates do not include costs that are difficult or impossible to
measure in terms of dollars.9" These costs include the loss of cultural and
archaeological resources and natural environments that cannot be re-
placed.96 To combat this growing problem, the International Climate
Change Taskforce recommends developing and deploying"cleaner energy
and transportation technologies" that "use energy more efficiently and
generate it from renewable resources." "
E. Summary
The use of more efficient and renewable technologies to combat
global warming will require a move away from fossil fuels9" and thus
92 Andrew C. Revkin, BigArctic Perils Seen in Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,2004, at Al.
" Degrees of Difference, ECONOMIST, May 1-7, 2004, at 80.
94 Id.
95 RICHARD L. OTTINGER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF ELECTRICITY 90 (1990).
Some environmental risks seem to defy economic valuation, either
because the risk itself defies measurement or because the risk has no
economic counterpart. Or, an economic assessment may be deemed
inappropriate for reasons including ethical considerations, political
sensitivity, or lack of adequate time and resources to conduct a study.
Id.
96 Id.
9' MEETING THE CLIMATE CHALLENGE, supra note 84, at 1.
98 Id.
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away from the United States' traditional energy sources. This environ-
mental imperative, along with changing economic assumptions about the
energy market change and new threats to our energy security, underlies
the changes taking place in the energy market. An energy policy for the
21st century must provide solutions to these problems.
III. AN ENERGY POLICY FOR THE EMERGING ENERGY MARKET
Recent years have seen new challenges arise in America's energy
market. These challenges have come from a number of sources, but can
generally be classified as either economic, environmental, or security
concerns. Overcoming these challenges will not be easy. The National
Energy Policy Development Group, which is composed of high govern-
ment officials such as Vice President Cheney, the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Energy, has stated: "[The energy challenge] will call forth
innovations in science, research, and engineering. It will require time and
the best efforts of leaders in both political parties. It will require also
that we deal with the facts as they are, meeting serious problems in a
serious way." " Fortunately, solutions exist if the political will can be
found to implement them. Deregulation of the electric generation market
and the use of smaller, more efficient generators can create a more eco-
nomically efficient energy market. °0 At the same time, removing the
barriers faced by renewable energies while also promoting efficiency
can help mitigate the environmental damages caused by fossil fuels.'0 '
Finally, distributed generation and smart grid technology can alleviate
any threats to the security of the electricity infrastructure.' 2 Making
these solutions come to fruition will require a great deal of effort from
many people, but they can be accomplished. In the words of Vice President
Cheney, "Itihe tasks ahead are great but achievable." 3
99 NAT'L ENERGY POL'Y DEv. GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY: RELIABLE, AFFORDABLE,
AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE, at xv (2001), http'/lwww.
whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf [hereinafter NATIoNAL ENERGY POLICY].
1- See infra Part III.A.
'0' See infra Part III.B.
102 See infra Part III.C.
"03 Dick Cheney, Cover Letter to NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, supra note 99.
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A. The New Energy Market Economics
To form an effective market in the twenty-first century, the United
States government needs to accomplish three tasks. The government
must encourage smaller energy plants to take advantage of their higher
efficiency, require a uniform system of deregulation, and create an
accurate pricing system.1 4 Slowing growth in the energy market and the
higher efficiency of small scale generators have made large, centralized
electric plants less profitable than smaller generators."°5 The use of
smaller power plants allows utilities to generate power closer to
consumers. 1 6 This concept is known as distributed generation, 10 7 and it
offers many economic advantages over a centralized grid.0'
First, distributed generation allow utilities to add generators only
when demand for the power actually exists. 0 9 As a result, by adding gen-
erators piecemeal, utility companies can avoid the expensive overcapac-
ity that comes with building a large centralized plant in anticipation of
future demand. 110 Second, avoiding overcapacity helps reduce the costs of
electricity generation by reducing the amount of fixed costs utilities must
pay to satisfy the same demand."' This creates lower variable costs for the
utilities."2 Distributed generation provides another economic benefit: be-
cause small generators reach their maximum production sooner than cen-
tralized plants, they pay for themselves much sooner than larger plants."'
Finally, distributed generation gives utilities the ability to add new trans-
mission and distribution capabilities only when they are needed." 4 This
4 See supra notes 54-73 and accompanying text.
1o' See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
106 Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 8, at 518.
107 Id.
Distributed generation ("DG") is an alternative source of electricity
generation that focuses on small-scale power production. The core
concept behind DG is that power will be produced locally, instead of
relying on large regional grids for transmission and distribution. DG
power producers will be much smaller and will rely on a variety of energy
sources and technologies such as solar cells and wind turbines.
Id. at 505 (citation omitted).
108 EDINGER & KAUL, supra note 35, at 77-79.
'o9 Id. at 78.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 77.
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allows utilities to avoid the expensive overcapacity in transmission and
distribution that accompany an overcapacity in generation."1 ' All of these
factors combine to make distributed generation more economically effi-
cient for utilities than large, centralized power plants.
The new economics of energy will also require a uniform system
of deregulation to make the energy market more efficient. 116 Deregu-
lation of the energy market occurred recently for two reasons: "the sale of
electricity is not a 'natural monopoly"' and "markets can set electricity
prices better."" 7 The electricity market is no longer a natural monopoly
because economies of scale have disappeared from the market."18 As util-
ities lost economies of scale, prices rose and governments began to take
tentative steps towards deregulation to control them."9 At the same time,
the market became a more effective price setter for electricity once the
efficiency of small-scale generators allowed many producers to compete
in the market. 2 ° With an increased number of producers available in the
market, real competition can exist and prices should drop. 2' Though state
and federal efforts towards deregulation take steps in the right direction,
a uniform approach is required in order to maximize efficiency.'22
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") put forth
a plan to bring about such a uniform system of deregulation.' 23 FERC's
plan focused on the creation of Regional Transmission Organizations
("RTO"s) that would acquire the power generated by individual utilities
and transmit and distribute it independently.'24 FERC identified seven
fundamental components of such a system:
115Id.
116 Eisen, supra note 71, at 587.
117 Realizing the Promise of Electricity Deregulation, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 411, 418
(2005).
118 See supra notes 54-73 and accompanying text.
119 See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
120 Pierce, supra note 61, at 461.
121 Spence, supra note 69, at 422.
122 Eisen, supra note 71, at 587 (explaining that "muddling through the application of
difficult competition schemes has led to an unclear and incoherent regulatory structure,
a great deal of uncertainty in the industry, a lack of uniformity in governing mechanisms,
and a haphazard and incomplete transition to a fair and competitive marketplace").
123 FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, WHITE PAPER: WHOLESALE POWER MARKET
PLATFORM (2003), available at http://www.ferc.gov/press-roonpress-releases/2003/2003-2/
Whitepaper.pdf [hereinafter WHOLESALE POWER MARKET PLATFORM]. See also Eisen,
supra note 71, at 566-69.
"u Charles H. Koch, Jr., Collaborative Governance in the Restructured Electricity Industry,
40 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 589 (2005).
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* Independent operation of the transmission grid by
the RTO to ensure that all suppliers have access to
the market;
* Individual transmission plans for each region to
best address regional needs and capabilities;
* A fair system of cost allocation for electricity trans-
mission and upgrades to the grid;
* The authority for FERC to monitor and mitigate
market power to ensure that the prices are only re-
sponsive to supply and demand, not market power;
0 The existence of spot markets (short term emer-
gency markets) to guard against shortages;
* An effective system to resolve transmission conges-
tion to protect consumers from manipulation and
ensure low costs; and
* Firm transmission rights to ensure customers
get service on the transmission paths specified in
their agreements so that congestion charges can
be avoided.'25
For such a plan to work, FERC would need the power to divest the gen-
eration capacity owners of the natural monopolies of transmission and
distribution lines.'26 The Federal Power Act does not give FERC this au-
thority, and thus states who do not wish to deregulate have been able to
halt efforts to establish a uniform system of deregulation.'27
'
2 5 WHOLESALE POWER MARKET PLATFORM, supra note 123, at 6-10.
126 Pierce, supra note 61, at 464-65.
127 Id.
The main legal problems that have halted the restructuring process,
and that threaten to render ineffective even the regional markets that
have been restructured, fall under the general heading of federalism.
States have far too much power, and FERC has far too little power.
FERC's admonitions and entreaties have been sufficient to induce
market participants to cooperate with FERC's restructuring initiatives
in regions in which state authorities are generally supportive of re-
structuring-the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States. In regions in which
states are opposed to restructuring, however, FERC's limited powers
are not up to the task.
Id. at 484.
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Given FERC's inability to effectively deregulate the electricity
market, many states have made attempts at deregulation. 128 Unfortu-
nately, few of these steps have been coordinated.' 29 As a result, the energy
market has become disorganized and uncompetitive as different laws
control different markets. 3 ° As Professor Eisen states, "muddling through
the application of different competition schemes has led to an unclear
and incoherent regulatory structure, a great deal of uncertainty in the
industry, a lack of uniformity in governing mechanisms, and a haphaz-
ard and incomplete transition to a fair and competitive marketplace."' 3 '
A uniform, federal deregulation scheme is needed to overcome this prob-
lem because both regulation as traditionally practiced and partial deregu-
lation have proven to be economically inefficient.
Slowing growth in the demand for electricity coupled with increased
efficiencies of small generators will change energy economics in the 21st
century. In short, economic forces in the new energy market will create a
need for smaller scale electricity generation and uniform deregulation in
the market.
B. The New Energy Market Environmentalism
As global warming has increased, with its detrimental environmen-
tal and economic impacts,'32 there has been growing speculation that
human use of fossil fuels has directly contributed to the problem.'33 Burning
fossil fuels adds greenhouse gases to the atmosphere and has likely played
a role in causing global warming.' In response to the environmental threat
posed by global warming, pressure has increased on governments to reduce
128 See supra notes 116-27 and accompanying text.
129 Id.
130 Eisen, supra note 71, at 587.
1
3 1 Id.
132 See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
See Sweeney, supra note 25.
1 Global Warming: Climate, supra note 85.
According to the National Academy of Sciences, the Earth's surface tem-
perature has risen by about 1 degree Fahrenheit in the past century,
with accelerated warming during the past two decades. There is new
and stronger evidence that most of the warming over the last 50 years
is attributable to human activities. Human activities have altered the
chemical composition of the atmosphere through the buildup of green-
house gases-primarily carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide.
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greenhouse gas emissions.'35 Some of the fundamental steps include a
significantly increased investment in renewable energy and other highly
efficient technologies while also reducing the barriers that help keep these
technologies out of the market.'36 As pressure grows to bring these steps to
fruition, the energy market should also change accordingly.
According to the International Climate Change Taskforce, a strategy
to stop the man-made causes of global warming should focus on "developing
low-carbon or no-carbon energy sources, including renewable energy, and
increasing energy efficiency."'37 More specifically, G8 countries, including
the United States, should establish renewable portfolio standards of twenty-
five percent by 2025, increase research and development spending on clean
technologies, and reduce the many barriers that stand in the way of these
technologies effectively competing in the energy market. 38 Each of these
steps would reduce the amount of greenhouse gases emitted and help
eliminate the human contribution to global warming.
39
First, renewable portfolio standards, also known as renewable
electricity standards, "require[] electric utilities to gradually increase
their use of renewable energy resources."140 Renewable portfolio standards
have shown success on the state level in reducing harmful greenhouse
gas emissions.'' In all, twenty states have enacted renewable portfolio
standards.' By 2017 these standards should reduce CO 2 emissions by
almost 75 million metric tons, an amount equivalent to the emissions
produced by 11.1 million cars.4 3 Enacted on a national level, renewable
portfolio standards could greatly reduce the amount of greenhouse gases
emitted in the United States in the relatively near future."
135 Id.
136 MEETING THE CLIMATE CHALLENGE, supra note 84, at 10.
137 Id. at 7.13 8 Id. at ix.
139 See id.
14o Union of Concerned Scientists, Experts Agree: Renewable Electricity Standards are
a Key Driver of New Renewable Energy Development, httpJ/www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/
clean-energy-policiesexperts-agree-renewable-electricity-standards-are-a-key-driver-
of-new-renewable-energy.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
141 Union of Concerned Scientists, Renewable Energy-Mitigating Global Warming,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/clean energy-policies/RES-climate-strategy.html
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
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Second, along with requiring the increased use of renewable energy,
the International Climate Change Taskforce also recommends increasing
research and development for renewables and removing the barriers that
keep them out of the market.145 The main barriers fall into two catego-
ries: commercialization barriers and price barriers.'46 Commercialization
barriers include a lack of infrastructure in all aspects of the renewable
energy industry and the need for manufacturers of renewable generators
to reach economies of scale for their own assembly lines.147 Without an
infrastructure or economies of scale, renewables will not be able to compete
with other, more established technologies." 4 Developing infrastructure
will require large sources of capital early on in the process.'49 Developing
economies of scale will require an expanded market so producers can
expand their operations.15 Enacting a national renewable portfolio stan-
dard presents the easiest means of creating an expanded market.'5 '
Price distortions include the unequal subsidies for research and
development between fossil fuels and renewable energy, the lower tax
burden for conventional power generators, and the failure of the market
to take into account the environmental costs of fossil fuels.152 First, nuclear
and conventional power generators, including coal, oil, and natural gas,
received $2.8 billion in Federal subsidies in 1999.' During the same
year, all renewable energies, which need large subsidies for infrastruc-
ture development, just over $1 billion. 14 Secondly, conventional energy
generators also benefit from a much lower tax burden because they can
deduct their fuel expenses from income and their property taxes are
generally lower as well. 5 Finally, the impact of fossil fuels on both the
'45 MEETING THE CLIMATE CHALLENGE, supra note 84, at ix.
"'See Union of Concerned Scientists, Barriers to the Use of Renewable Energy Technologies,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/renewable-energy-basics/barriers-to-renewable-
energy-technologies.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 id.
153 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEPT OF ENERGY, FEDERAL FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS AND
SUBSIDIES IN ENERGY MARKETS 1999: PRIMARY ENERGY, at tbl.ES1, http://www.eia.doe
.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/ subsidy/tableesl.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
154 Id.
155 Barriers to the Use of Renewable Energy Technologies, supra note 146.
In addition to receiving subsidies for research and development, con-
ventional generating technologies have a lower tax burden. Fuel expen-
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environment and human health'56 are not taken into account in the pric-
ing of conventional power.1 57 Instead, conventional energy generators pass
on the environmental and social costs to the government who in turn pass
that cost onto electric consumers in the form of taxes. 15 Before renew-
able energy technology can become truly competitive in the marketplace
the United States will have to remove these price distortions, along with
the commercialization barriers.159 Once these barriers are removed re-
newable portfolio standards along with market forces could expand the
use of renewable energy to help alleviate the detrimental environmental
effects of global warming.
C. Security in the New Energy Market
Security concerns are also shaping the new energy market.60 In
light of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the recent blackouts in
California and New York, the vulnerability of the centralized infrastruc-
ture and the potential problems caused by its destruction have become
ditures can be deducted from taxable income, but few renewables benefit
from this deduction, since most do not use market-supplied fuels. Income
and property taxes are higher for renewables, which require large capital
investments but have low fuel and operating expenses. A 1996 study by
Resources for the Future found that the total tax burden of natural gas
facilities is only 0.507c/kWh (in 1993 dollars), compared with 1.521c/kWh
for biomass generators. Even if the renewable energy production tax
credit were counted (no biomass plants had qualified as of 1998), the tax
burden would be over 50 percent higher than for a natural gas plant.
The tax burden for wind energy is approximately as high as for biomass.
Id. (citation omitted).
6 See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
157 EDINGER & KAUL, supra note 35, at 101-105.
[C]urrent government taxation practices do not add environmental and
social costs to the price of energy. This leads to prices lower than the real
cost of processing energy and thus increases demand over the level that
would occur in a world of internalized environmental and social costs.
Id. at 105.158 Id. at 106.
.
59 Lakshman D. Guruswamy, A New Framework: Post-Kyoto Energy and Environmental
Security, 16 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POLy 333,344 (2005) ("The technical and economic
barriers to the deployment of renewable energy technologies are influenced by govern-
mental decision making. Government regulations, which deal with economic incentives,
taxes, charges, subsidies, licensing, R&D, conservation, and environmental regulations,
could encourage or discourage renewable energy and therefore should be explored.").
160 Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 8, at 516.
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obvious.'61 Two main options exist to help alleviate the threat to the
centralized grid: creation of a system of distributed generation that is
less vulnerable to attack, and the use of smart grid technology that can
effectively deal with the loss any generating capability.
16 2
Due to the vulnerability of a centralized electric infrastructure,
distributed generation reduces the exposure of the electric system by using
many small scale generators to produce power locally.' With electric
generators spread out and producing smaller amounts of energy, any
attack against the infrastructure would have a smaller impact on the
overall functioning of electricity generation and transmission systems.164
However, the security provided by distributed generation depends in large
part upon on a reliable distribution system. 6 '
The Energy Future Coalition has determined that, "[iit is vitally
important that the electricity grid be capable of real-time management
and instant correction in order to minimize the risk of disruption and the
time for recovery, if a terrorist attack on the system does occur."1 6 For
such management to occur, large technological upgrades, referred to collec-
tively as "smart grid" technology, will need to be implemented.'67 "Smart
grid" technology will incorporate improved sensing and monitoring capa-
bilities, improved communications, and new information technology. 6 '
As a result, the smart grid will self-heal to avoid outages, be more re-
sponsive to physical and cyber threats, and allow use of distributed gen-
eration. '69 With these technologies in place any disruption can be limited
in its scope and compensated for with electricity from other facilities. 170
For this reason smart grid technology, along with distributed generation,
will be necessary components of the new energy market to ensure its
protection from any potential attack.
161 See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
162 Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 8, at 516.
'" Joseph P. Tomain, Nuclear Futures, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 221, 247 (2005).
'64 Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 8, at 519; Ferrey, supra note 73, at 281 ("Analysts argue
that a distributed energy system... is much less subject to disruption, whether from
weather, terrorism, or other factors, than the centralized generation and distribution
system employed in the United States.").
16 Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 8, at 525.
166 ENERGY FUTURE COAL., CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY: CHARTING A NEW ENERGY
FUTURE 77 (2003), http://www.energyfuturecoalition.org/pubs/EFC%20Report.pdf.
167 Id. at 75.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 76.
17 0Id. at 29.
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D. Summary
In short, the new energy market will need to produce energy with
small scale gas generators and efficient renewables distributed through-
out a decentralized smart grid in a deregulated electricity generation
market.1 ' The market must also be able to hold conventional producers
responsible for environmental costs.172 The federal government must also
remove the subsidy advantage enjoyed by conventional producers and
give renewable technologies the means to break into the market on an
equal footing.' 3 This combination of new technology and revamped eco-
nomic thinking will ensure affordable electricity while protecting our
infrastructure and environment in the 21st century.
However, the new energy market will be slow in emerging as the
United States is still firmly rooted in the old system.174 To further the
creation of the new energy market the United States needs strong leg-
islation to kick-start the process. Does the Energy Policy Act of 2005
fulfill this need? At the signing of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, President
Bush claimed it did by saying, "[tihis bill will strengthen our economy
and it will improve our environment, and it's going to make this country
more secure."175 Representative Sam Farr of California voiced a more
skeptical opinion:
Frankly, this bill is an embarrassment-after six years of
discussion and negotiation, the best we have to offer is a
bill that in effect preserves the status quo? Instead of
providing forward-looking policy ideas for a sound energy
future, [the Energy Policy Act] is content to drive us into
the future by looking through the rearview mirror with its
heavily weighted dependence on fossil fuels.' 76
To determine whose opinion is correct, a study of the Act from both a
historical and contemporary perspective is essential.
171 See supra notes 99-127 and accompanying text.
172 Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 8, at 518-19, 525-28.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Bush, supra note 3.
176 151 CONG. REC. E1736-02 (daily ed. July 29, 2005) (statement of Rep. Farr).
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IV. THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005 IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Traditionally, the United States has focused on using fossil fuels
(domestic if possible) to generate its energy.'77 At different times this focus
has centered around coal, oil, or gas. 7 ' In 2004, coal accounted for fifty
percent of electricity production while nuclear power and natural gas
followed at twenty and eighteen percent respectively.7 9 Hydroelectric
power and a host of minor sources accounted for the remaining thirteen
percent. 0 The previous twenty years followed much the same pattern.''
During this same time period other policy trends have emerged as well,
mainly to combat the problems caused by fossil fuels.8 2 In response to
these problems the United States has also focused on efficiency and
nuclear power along with the limited use of renewable energy sources."
Recent energy policy in the United States has incorporated these four
bases: fossil fuels, efficiency, nuclear power, and renewable energy."s The
Energy Policy Act of 2005 also incorporates these elements.
A. Fossil Fuels
As Part I detailed, fossil fuels have historically dominated the
generation of power in the United States.8 5 More recently, coal and natural
gas combined to produce sixty-nine percent of America's electricity.'86
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 follows in this tradition by massively sub-
sidizing the use of fossil fuels. Specifically, the Act provides incentives
for the production of oil and gas, the expansion of facilities for importing
natural gas, the construction of new storage facilities for natural gas, and
the use of clean coal technology.'
177 See SCHURR ET AL., supra note 12, at 35.
178 Id.
179 ELECTRICITY NET GENERATION, REP. No. DOE/EIA-0384 (2005), ANNUAL ENERGY
REVIEW 2005, at tbl.8.2(a) (2006), http//www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec8-6.pdf.
180 Id.
181Id.
182 See STAGLIANO, supra note 24, at 20-58.
183 Id.
184 Id.
i"5 See supra Part I.
186 See STAGLIANO, supra note 24, at 20-58.
187 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 311, 313, 341-57, 361-74, 401-404,
119 Stat. 594, 685-88, 697-737, 749-54 (2005).
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First, the Federal government gave oil and gas companies do-
mestic production incentives by reducing their royalty rates (money paid
back to the government in return for access to federal land).' The Act
also streamlines the process for siting liquefied natural gas terminals and
for approving new refinery facilities. 8 s Congress also appropriated $4.8
billion towards coal programs meant to develop next generation coal
technologies and bring current technologies in line with the Clean Air
Act. 9 ' At the same time, the Energy Policy Act gave $2.5 billion towards
conservation efforts in fossil fuel use.'9 ' Finally, the Act funded numerous
research and development programs for fossil fuels.'92 Nothing in these
giant subsidies for fossil fuel technology suggests that the Federal govern-
ment plans on moving away from a fossil fuel dependent energy market
anytime soon.
B. Efficiency
In the past, Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Bush all empha-
sized increasing energy efficiency to help offset the problems caused by
using fossil fuels.'93 In 1971, President Nixon advocated increased effi-
ciency even before the 1973 oil crisis."94 When Congress finally addressed
the oil crisis with legislation in 1975, its Energy Policy and Conservation
Act implemented fuel efficiency standards for automobiles. 95 President
Carter expanded efficiency beyond automobiles by advocating more energy-
efficient homes as well. 19 Finally, President George H.W. Bush, in the
United States' last energy act in 1992, included efficiency standards for
appliances and lighting fixtures.197 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 follows
in these footsteps.
First, the Act uses tax incentives to promote energy efficiency by
giving breaks to businesses and consumers who use efficient appliances
'
8 Id. §§ 342, 345-46.
9 Id. § 312.
190 U.S. HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COM., ENERGY POLICY AcT OF 2005 HIGHLIGHTS
3 (2005), httpJ/energycommerce.house.gov/108/energy-pdfs-2.htm (follow "Energy Policy
Act of 2005 Highlights" hyperlink).
191 Id.
192 Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 961-68.
'
93 See STAGLIANO, supra note 24, at 20-43.
194 Id. at 21.
195 Id. at 30.
196 Id. at 35.
197 Id. at 325.
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or construct efficient properties.198 Specifically, among other credits, home-
builders can receive a $2,000 credit for building "homes that use 50 percent
less energy for space heating and cooling than homes built according to
the 2003 International Energy Conservation Code."' 99 Tax credits of up
to $1.80 or $.60 per square foot also exist for new and upgraded com-
mercial buildings respectively. 200 Producers of energy-efficient appli-
ances, such as refrigerators, clothes washers, and dishwashers, receive
a credit for the sale of these appliances for the amount beyond the aver-
age number they had sold in the previous three years.20' Finally, tax credits
exist for the use of air conditioners, heat pumps, furnaces, and water
heaters that meet certain efficiency requirements and are used in non-
business applications.0 2
In addition to these tax credits for energy efficiency, the Energy
Policy Act also sets new efficiency standards for certain residential and
commercial products.203 These efficiency standards apply to products which
run for long periods of time such as ceiling fans, de-humidifiers, refrig-
erators, and traffic lights.2 4 The Act also instructs the Department of
Energy to make standards in the near future for other products that are
not currently regulated, such as battery chargers and beverage vending
machines. °5 Finally, the Energy Policy Act establishes a number of
smaller programs meant to promote efficiency in the United States. 2 6 Most
notably, the Act authorizes rebates for Energy Star appliances, sets new
efficiency standards for federal and public buildings, and extends
daylight savings time for one month.20 7 Through programs such as these,
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 follows the recent pattern of promoting
efficiency in the United States' energy market.
198 See Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 1331-37.
'
99 Id. § 1332; STEVEN NADEL, AM. CoUNc. FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT ECON., REP. No.
E053, THE FEDERAL ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ENERGY
EFFICIENCY PROGRAM EFFORTS 7 (2005), available at http://aceee.org/pubs/e053.pdf?
CFID=2432571&CFTOKEN=57391724.
200 Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1331; NADEL, supra note 199, at 3.
201 Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1334; NADEL, supra note 199, at 4.
202 Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1333; NADEL, supra note 199, at 5-6.
203 Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 135; NADEL, supra note 199, at 9-11.
204 Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 135; NADEL, supra note 199, at 9-11.
205 Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 135; NADEL, supra note 199, at 9-11.
206 Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 101-151.
207 Id. §§ 109-10, 124.
2006] 235
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
C. Nuclear Power
The Energy Policy Act also places a heavy emphasis on the use
of nuclear power."' This emphasis on nuclear power does not completely
follow precedent but it does have some historical basis. The use of com-
mercial nuclear power increased dramatically between 1966 and 1974 as
the technology became more accepted and America's dependence upon
foreign oil increased.2 °9 However, orders for new reactors decreased soon
thereafter and no new nuclear reactor has been built in the United States
since 1978.210 The United States began to move away from nuclear power
due, in part, to safety concerns after the Three Mile Island accident in
1979.211 Higher than expected start-up and design costs for nuclear power,
caused by a lack of experience with the technology, also played a role in
limiting its use.212 These factors, along with cheaper competition from coal
or natural gas power plants, caused policymakers to abandon any plans
for expanding nuclear power.213 However, despite the lack of new reactors
built, nuclear power has remained a staple of energy production in the
United States since the late 1960s.214 In 2003, nuclear power accounted for
twenty percent of the electricity generated in the United States.215
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 seeks to increase the use of nuclear
power in the United States by adding new nuclear power plants and sup-
porting research of new nuclear technologies. 216 To achieve these goals the
Act allocates hundreds of millions of dollars in subsidies, with a maximum
of nearly $500,000,000 in the fiscal year 2009.217 The Act also provides a
subsidy of $1,250,000,000 for the creation of a Generation IV reactor.218
208 See Bush, supra note 3.
2' Energy Information Administration, Energy in the United States: 1635-2000: Nuclear
Energy, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/eh/nuclear.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2006)
[hereinafter Nuclear Energy in the United States].
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 id.
214 Id.
215 Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Brief: United States, http/
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/usa.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
216 Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 951-52.
217 Id. § 951.
21
1 Id. For a description of Generation IV reactors, see Nuclear Energy Institute, Four
Generations of Reactors, http://www.nei.org/index.asp?catnum=3&catid=706 (last visited
Dec. 1, 2006). "These reactors will probably be deployed by 2030 and are expected to be
236 [Vol. 31:211
A TIME TO ACT ANEW
Nuclear energy has become popular again recently for many of the same
reasons it became popular in the 1970s: fear of a dependence on foreign oil
and a belief that the technology can be used safely.219 A growing aware-
ness of the environmental problems caused by fossil fuels adds another
factor to these traditional justifications.220 With that understanding, the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 can be seen as an extension of the policies that
originally endorsed the use of nuclear power over thirty years ago.
D. Renewable Energy
The Energy Policy Act also follows the recent policy tradition due
to its growing but still small focus on renewable energy. Renewable energy
first entered the U.S. national energy policy in the wake of the first
energy crisis in 1973.221 Presidents Nixon and Ford advocated Project
Independence which eventually resulted in Congress passing legislation
that established the Solar Energy Research Institute.222 Congress also
allocated "$75 million for research on commercial utilization of solar
energy."223 This legislation represented a minor investment in renewable
energy, but when President Carter took office, he made renewable energy
highly economical, incorporate enhanced safety, produce minimal waste, and be imper-
vious to proliferation." Id.
219 Bush, supra note 3; Nuclear Energy in the United States, supra note 209.
220 Economist.com, Nuclear Power: Making a Comeback? (May 1, 2001), http://www
.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?storyjid=EIGTDVNQ. See also Bush, supra
note 3. President Bush described these justifications for nuclear power in his speech at
the signing of the Energy Policy Act:
[T]his bill will allow America to make cleaner and more productive use
of our domestic energy resources, including coal, and nuclear power, and
oil and natural gas. By using these reliable sources to supply more of our
energy, we'll reduce our reliance on energy from foreign countries ....
Nuclear power is another of America's most important sources of elec-
tricity. Of all our nation's energy sources, only nuclear power plants
can generate massive amounts of electricity without emitting an ounce
of air pollution or greenhouse gases. And thanks to the advances in
science and technology, nuclear plants are far safer than ever before.
Yet America has not ordered a nuclear plant since the 1970s. To coor-
dinate the ordering of new plants, the bill I sign today continues the
Nuclear Power 2010 Partnership between government and industry.
Id.
221 See STAGLIANO, supra note 24, at 32.
222 See BROWN, supra note 26, at 228.
223/id.
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one of the main planks of his energy policy.224 As a result of President
Carter's emphasis on renewable energy and the second energy crisis in
1979, Congress passed the Energy Security Act which authorized $20
billion for various renewable energy sources.225 By 1983 the Reagan
Administration had reduced the funding for many of these programs, 2 6
but the situation had changed again by the early 1990s. President George
H. W. Bush had promoted legislation that "proposed federally subsidized
loans to developers of electricity generation plants using solar, wind and
biomass energy, increased federal R&D investments to reduce the cost
of most renewable energy technologies ... .,,22' The National Energy
Policy enacted under the first President Bush stood as the U.S. national
energy policy until the Energy Policy Act of 2005 was signed into law.22
With a strong focus on renewable energy, the Energy Policy Act
of 2005 fits within the growing use of renewable energy in recent history.
229
Title II of the Energy Policy Act focuses on increasing the production of and
demand for renewable energy, while Title IX devotes much of its attention
to research and development of renewable energies.23 ° In all, the Energy
Policy Act gives nearly $3.5 billion in subsidies to renewable energy out
of a total of $14.6 billion in the entire bill.231 The subsidies for renewable
energy in this Act go towards increasing conversion efficiency of renew-
ables, decreasing cost of renewable generation, increasing the export of
U.S. renewable technology, increasing the amount of renewable energy
used by the Federal government, and encouraging consumers to install
their own renewable energy sources.232 In all, the Energy Policy Act pro-
vides the largest commitment to renewable energy in United States history.
224 Id. at 230 (stating that one of the President's objectives was "to develop renewable and
essentially inexhaustible sources of energy for sustained growth").22 1 Id. at 232. The energy crisis in 1979, while significantly less severe than the first energy
crisis in 1973, caused the United States to reconsider once again its dependence on foreign
oil. Id. at 231.
226 Id. at 233.
227 See STAGLIANO, supra note 24, at 392.
228 Bush, supra note 3.
229 See BROWN, supra note 26, at 225-36; see also STAGLIANO, supra note 24 (discussing
the history of national energy policy in the United States).
210 Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 203-04, 206, 209, 931.
211 Id.; Caspar W. Weinberger, An Energy Bill-At Last, FORBES, Oct. 3, 2005, at 35.
232 Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 203-04, 206, 209, 931.
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E. Summary
The United States has a long history of depending on fossil fuel
resources for our energy supply. For as long as the U.S. government has
developed energy policies, they have been founded on the use of fossil
fuels.233 Only since the 1970s, due to drastic changes in the energy market,
have policy makers begun to incorporate the use of alternative and re-
newable energy sources into their policies." 4 Nevertheless, these policies
have still depended almost exclusively on fossil fuel energy (with the ex-
ception of nuclear power).3 5 The Energy Policy Act of 2005, even with its
comparatively large support of renewable energy, fits squarely within
this broad historical trend of fossil fuel dependence. With that understand-
ing the analysis can move onto its second question: does the Act also bring
about the changes necessary for the twenty-first century?
V. THE ENERGY POLICY ACT IN A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE
The Energy Policy Act clearly follows the United States' historical
energy policy. However, these policies will prove ineffective in dealing
with the energy challenges of the next century. A truly effective Act must
meet these challenges, regardless of whether it also incorporates histor-
ical policies. As section III argued, some of the substantive changes needed
include deregulation of electricity generation, creation of a smart grid,
increased energy efficiency, building an infrastructure and market for
renewables, removing price distortions, and using small-scale, distributed
generation. Unfortunately, Congress proved unable or unwilling to pass an
Act capable of meeting most of the twenty-first century's energy challenges.
A. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 and Distributed Generation
The United States needs to create a distributed generation system
of electrical production in order to take advantage of the increased effi-
ciencies of smaller gas turbines and to protect its energy infrastructure
from a crippling attack. The Energy Policy Act provides large subsidies
for the research and development of "distributed energy resources."236
233 See generally SCHURR ET AL. supra note 12; STAGLIANO, supra note 24.
" See generally STAGLIANO, supra note 24.
235 See generally id.
236 Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 921.
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However, Congress did not coordinate these subsidies with the rest of
the Act as part of a larger plan to actually bring about a distributed gen-
eration system .23 As a result, the United States seems unlikely to create
a system of distributed generation in the near future.
To fund research and development of a distributed grid,238 Congress
allocated $768 million dollars for the fiscal years 2007 through 2009.239
Congress earmarked these funds for projects such as developing resi-
dential, small-scale power generation, 241 the development of small-scale
portable power devices, 241 and increasing the efficiency of high density
distribution systems.242 However, the most important step Congress took
was establishing a program "to ensure the reliability, efficiency, and en-
vironmental integrity of electrical transmission and distribution systems."'
While this program focuses largely on grid improvements, it does incor-
porate the "supply of electricity to the power grid by small scale, distrib-
uted and residential-based power generators" into the plan.244 To guide
the implementation of this plan, the Secretary of the Interior must give
to Congress a five year plan within one year of the bill's enactment.245
Unfortunately, this "electric transmission and distribution program" seems
unlikely to succeed because much of the Act either ignores or directly
contradicts its goals.246
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 921.
The Secretary shall carry out programs of research, development, demon-
stration, and commercial application on distributed energy resources
and systems reliability and efficiency, to improve the reliability and effi-
ciency of distributed energy resources and systems, integrating advanced
energy technologies with grid connectivity, including activities described
in this subtitle. The programs shall address advanced energy technol-
ogies and systems and advanced grid reliability technologies.
Id.
239 Id.
4oId. § 925.
' Id. § 924.
242 Id. § 922.
243Id.
244Id.
mId. § 866.
24 See id. § 865; Mark Squillace, Op.-Ed., Time for a Real Energy Plan: Failure to Develop
a Serious Energy Policy Threatens the Economy, the Environment, and America's National
Security, DENVER POST, Aug. 21, 2005, at E-01 ("However one might characterize this
mammoth new legislation, it is not energy policy. To be sure, it deals largely with energy
matters. But its unifying theme is not so much policy as pork.").
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For distributed generation to work, the electricity must come from
small-scale plants such as natural gas turbines and renewable genera-
tors.247 Congress, when dealing with natural gas and renewable energies
in the Act, never referenced the distributed generation program nor made
any attempt to coordinate the goals of that program and the small-scale
generators it depends upon.248 Without such coordination between the
development of the generation systems and the distribution program, im-
plementation of an effective distribution plan in the near future seems
unlikely at best.
In a move even more detrimental to the creation of a distributed
generation system, Congress appropriated large subsidies for nuclear and
coal powered generation.249 More specifically, the Act appropriates funds
for the construction of a new, Generation IV nuclear reactor to be opera-
tional by 2021250 and funds for the research and construction of clean-
coal generators.2 ' The Act also creates tax credits for both advanced
nuclear power and investment in clean coal facilities.252 These traditional
methods of electricity generation, which seem likely to continue far into
the future with these subsidies, require large scale plants that by defi-
nition cannot work within a distributed generation system.25 a In short,
by encouraging centralized generation and not effectively coordinating
a distributed generation program, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 does
little to actually create a distributed generation system in the near future
and ensures that much of the United States' power will continue to come
from centralized plants.
B. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 and Infrastructure and Market
Creation for Renewable Energy
Environmental concerns about fossil fuels and the greenhouse
gases they emit have created a need for the large-scale use of renewable
247 See supra Part III.
Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 201-11, 301-92.249 Id. §§ 401, 641-45.
250 This will be the first new reactor built in the United States since 1978. See supra note
210 and accompanying text.
251 Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 401-02, 421, 641-45.
252 Id. §§ 1306-07.
253 See supra Part III; see also Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 401-02, 421, 645. In total, the
Act gives $1,385,000,000 to clean coal generation and a minimum of $1.25 billion for
construction of the Generation IV reactor. Id.
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energy sources in the emerging energy market. 4 For renewables to suc-
ceed in reducing greenhouse gases, Congress needs to help build both an
infrastructure for the renewable industry and a market for its goods.255
To accomplish this goal, the International Climate Change Taskforce recom-
mends the use of both mandatory renewable portfolio standards, which
some states have successfully employed,25 and increased subsidies for
the industry.25 ' The Energy Policy Act enacted half of these recommen-
dations.25" The Act gives significant subsidies and tax credits to renew-
able energies but does not enact a renewable portfolio standard.259 As a
result, renewable manufacturers will have capital available to build infra-
structure but not a nationwide market in which to sell their products.
Congress provided large subsidies for renewable energy research
and development in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 through the Renewable
Energy Production Incentive.2 ° Specifically, Congress allocated $2.2 billion
towards programs meant to lower their costs, increase exports, and in-
crease efficiency (which will make them more suitable for a distributed
generation system).261 The research and development will focus largely
on solar energy,262 wind energy,263 geothermal, 264 hydro-power, 265 and
" See supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
255 See MEETING THE CLIMATE CHALLENGE, supra note 84.
25 James W. Moeller, Of Credits and Quotas: Federal Tax Incentives for Renewable Resources,
State Renewable Portfolio Standards, and the Evolution of Proposals for a Federal Renewable
Portfolio Standard, 51 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 69, 97 (2004) ("Consistent with the
observation that the fifty states have often act[ed] as laboratories for testing what will
later become federal policies, several states have pioneered the development of the RPS.").2 57 MEETING THE CLIMATE CHALLENGE, supra note 84.
25 Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 201-11, 1301, 1303.
259 Id. The Act authorizes "nearly $700 million for renewable energy grants and research
projects." 151 CONG. REC. S6392, S6393 (daily ed. June 13, 2005) (giving the Congressional
Budget Office's cost estimate for the Energy Policy Act of 2005).
260 See Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 931-35.
261 Id. § 931.
262 Id. § 931(a)(2)(A).
The Secretary shall conduct a program ofresearch, development, demon-
stration, and commercial application for solar energy, including-
(i) photovoltaics;
(ii) solar hot water and solar space heating;
(iii) concentrating solar power;
(iv) lighting systems that integrate sunlight and electrical lighting in
complement to each other in common lighting fixtures for the purpose
of improving energy efficiency;
(v) manufacturability of low cost, high quality solar systems; and
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bio-energy. 66 As a result, these technologies should have capital avail-
able to build an infrastructure incorporating the latest technologies.
(vi) development of products that can be easily integrated into new and
existing buildings.
Id.2 63 Id. § 931(a)(2)(B).
The Secretary shall conduct a program of research, development, demon-
stration, and commercial application for wind energy, including-
(i) low speed wind energy;
(ii) offshore wind energy;
(iii) testing and verification (including construction and operation of a
research and testing facility capable of testing wind turbines); and
(iv) distributed wind energy generation.
Id.2 64 Id. § 931(a)(2)(C).
The Secretary shall conduct a program of research, development, demon-
stration, and commercial application for geothermal energy. The program
shall focus on developing improved technologies for reducing the costs
of geothermal energy installations, including technologies for-
(i) improving detection of geothermal resources;
(ii) decreasing drilling costs;
(iii) decreasing maintenance costs through improved materials;
(iv) increasing the potential for other revenue sources, such as mineral
production; and
(v) increasing the understanding of reservoir life cycle and management.
Id.
265 Id. § 931(a)(2)(D).
The Secretary shall conduct a program of research, development, dem-
onstration, and commercial application for cost competitive technol-
ogies that enable the development of new and incremental hydropower
capacity, adding to the diversity of the energy supply of the United
States, including:
(i) Fish-friendly large turbines.
(ii) Advanced technologies to enhance environmental performance and
yield greater energy efficiencies.
Id.26 6 d. § 932(b).
The Secretary shall conduct a program of research, development, demon-
stration, and commercial application for bioenergy, including-
(1) biopower energy systems;
(2) biofuels;
(3) bioproducts;
(4) integrated biorefineries that may produce biopower, biofuels, and
bioproducts;
(5) cross-cutting research and development in feedstocks; and
(6) economic analysis.
2006] 243
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
Congress also used tax credits to increase the amount of capital avail-
able to the renewable industry for the development of infrastructure.267
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 uses tax credits to develop the renew-
able energy industry in two ways: extending the Renewable Electricity
Production Tax Credit and giving tax credits to the holders of clean re-
newable energy bonds.26" First, the Renewable Electricity Production
Tax Credit gives electric producers a tax credit for each kilowatt hour of
electricity they produce from qualifying renewable sources.269 Geothermal
energy, solar energy, wind energy, and closed loop biomass energy each
receive a credit of 1.5 cents per kilowatt hour.27 ° Open loop biomass and
hydroelectric power receive credits of 0.75 cents per kilowatt hour.
2 71
Secondly, the Act also uses renewable bond tax credits to encour-
age the investment of private capital into the renewable energy industry.272
The American Public Power Association describes the process this way:
A tax credit bond is essentially a debt instrument to be
issued for qualified renewable facilities under Section 45,
which allows its investors to receive credits against their
federal income tax liability instead of the traditional in-
terest that is usually paid by the issuer. So the municipal-
ity or cooperative would simply be liable for the face value
of the bond, and save by owing no interest on the bond. The
federal government would essentially pay the "interest" in
the form of tax credits.
However, any project receiving funding from the Renewable Energy
Production Incentive program does not qualify as an eligible program for
renewable bond tax credits.274 Through these tax credits and subsidies,
267 See id. §§ 1301, 1303.
268 id.
269 Id.; Moeller, supra note 256, at 89.
270 Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 1301; NORTHEAST REG'L BIOMASS PROGRAM, RENEWABLE
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT: ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005 (2005), http://www
.energy.ky.gov/2005federalenergybill.htm (follow 'Electricity Producers" hyperlink)
[hereinafter RENEWABLE ENERGY PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT].
271 RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT, supra note 270.
272 Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1303.
27 3 AM. PUB. POWER ASS'N, IssuE BRIEF: COMPARABLE TAX INCENTIVES FOR PUBLIC POWER
DEVELOPMENT OF CLEAN RESOURCES 2 (2005), http://www.appanet.org/files/Comparable
TaxIncentivesforPublicPowerDevelopmentofCleanResourceslBjulyO5.pdf.
274 Id.
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the Energy Policy Act of 2005 does give the capital necessary for the
renewable industry to build a strong infrastructure. Unfortunately, the
Act does not also enact a renewable portfolios standard ("RPS") that
would create a nationwide market for renewable energy products.
The Senate included a national renewable portfolio standard of
ten percent in their version of the bill, as they have with all their energy
bills since 2002.275 Unfortunately, the RPS was not included in the final
version of the bill that passed both houses.2 6 The Act does contain a
"federal purchase requirement" that requires the Federal government to
buy 7.5 percent of its power from renewable resources by 2013.27 Dis-
agreement, however, exists over the effectiveness of this requirement. Some
hope that this federal purchase requirement will stimulate the growth
of a national renewable market.278 Others, such as Representative Mark
Udall, believe that "[t]he absence of an RPS in this [Energy Policy Act] is
a serious setback for forward-thinking energy policy."27 9 Representative
Udall appears to have a stronger argument given that the United States
government only consumed 1.6 percent of the energy produced in the
United States in 2004.20 Taking into account that renewables will only
account for 7.5 percent of the 1.6 percent that the government consumes,
the federal purchase requirement does not seem capable of creating the
market necessary to support large-scale renewable energy production.28'
Reducing global warming will require a large commitment to zero
and low-emissions technologies, in particular renewable energy. For re-
newable energy to play a significant role in this effort, the United States
government must create an infrastructure and market in which the re-
newable industry can grow. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 does provide
275 151 CONG. REC. E1725-02, E1726 (daily ed. July 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. Udall).
See also SHIRLEY NEFF, CENTER FOR ENERGY, MARINE TRANSP. AND PUB. POLY AT COLUMBIA
U., REVIEW OF THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005, at 2 (Aug. 2, 2005), http://www.cemtpp
.orgfPDFs/EnergyBillHighlights.pdf.
276 NEFF, supra note 275, at 2.
277 Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 203. The federal purchase requirement will work on a
graduated basis by requiring the government to purchase 3 percent from renewables
through 2007, 5 percent through 2010, and finally 7.5 percent in 2013 and thereafter. Id.
278 NEFF, supra note 275, at 2.
279 Statement of Rep. Udall, supra note 275, at E1726.
280 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW: ENERGY OVERVIEW, 7, 25 (2004),
http'//www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/overview.html (noting that the United States produced
70.369 quadrillion btu of energy in 2004 while the United States government only
consumed 1.177 quadrillion btu in the same year).2 1 See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
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adequate subsidies and tax credits to build infrastructure but leaves it
up to the states and private industry to create a market for renewable
energy products.
C. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 and Removing Price Distortions
Besides developing market and infrastructure, Congress will also
need to remove the price distortions inherent in the energy market for
renewable energies to be cost competitive in the future.282 Factors such
as unequal subsidies, unequal tax credits, and the market's failure to
account for the environmental costs of fossil fuels all unfairly benefit
traditional energy generation.283 In fact, these benefits allow traditional
utilities to charge a below market price for their power.2" In this artificial
market renewable energy does not present a cost-effective source of energy
for consumers.28 A policy committed to improving the environment through
renewable energy source use would remove these distortions. The Energy
Policy Act of 2005 leaves them in place.
First, the Act does not remove the unequal subsidies enjoyed by
traditional generators. Specifically, "[olf the bill's total $14.6 billion in tax
incentives, $9.3 billion (or 64 percent) is for traditional energy sources such
as oil, natural gas, and nuclear power. "286 The Clean Coal Power Initiative,
meant to "advance [the] efficiency, environmental performance, and cost
competitiveness" of clean coal, receives $200 million per year for 2006-
2014.287 To promote the deployment of this technology on a large scale,
Congress gave another $2.5 billion for the years 2007-2013.288 Congress also
gave large subsidies to nuclear power.289 Congress allocated $1.25 billion to
build a Generation IV nuclear reactor while also earmarking another $1.18
billion towards "programs of civilian nuclear energy research, development,
demonstration, and commercial application . "..."290 General fossil fuel
programs meant to improve "the efficiency, effectiveness, and environmen-
tal performance of fossil energy production" also received nearly $1.9 billion
282 See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
283 See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
284 See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
285 See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
286 Statement of Rep. Udall, supra note 275, at E1726.
287 Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 401-02.
288 Id, § 421.
289 See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
2"0 Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 951.
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in Congressional funding.291 These subsidies far outpace the $3.5 billion
given to renewable energy sources.292
Second, while the Act does give tax credits to renewable energy
sources, 29 3 it also grants significant credits for traditional sources.294
Energy produced by advanced nuclear facilities, which must be placed
in service by 2021, receives a tax credit of 1.8 cents per kilowatt hour for
the first eight years of production. 295 The Act also creates 20 percent
investment tax credits for investing in new clean coal facilities. 296 Both
of these credits are larger than their corresponding credits for investing
in renewable energies.297 For example, renewables only receive production
credits of up to 1.5 cents per kilowatt hour and investment tax credits
of 10 percent.298
Finally, Congress also needs to create an energy market that more
accurately accounts for environmental and social costs caused by tradi-
tional energy sources that are not currently reflected in market prices.299
The Act requires the National Academy of Sciences to "conduct a study
to define and evaluate the health, environmental, security, and infra-
structure external costs and benefits associated with the production and
consumption of energy that are not or may not be fully incorporated into
the market price of such energy. " "' The National Academy of Science
does not have to complete their study until two years after the passage
of the Act so its final impact remains uncertain.3"' However, speculation
exists that the study could cause changes in the United States' environ-
mental policies.30 2 What is certain is that Congress has taken a positive
291 Id. § 961.
212 See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
21 See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
" See Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 1306-07, 1325-26.295 Id. § 1306.
296 Id. § 1307.
... See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text; JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, DESCRIPTION
OF THE "ENERGY POLICY TAX INCENTIVES ACT OF 2005", at 15-17 (2005), http://www.house
.gov/jct/x-44-05.pdf [hereinafter DESCRIPTION OF TAX INCENTIVES].
298 DESCRIPTION OF TAX INCENTIVES, supra note 297, at 15-16.
299 See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
300 Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1352.
301 Id.
302 NAS Study ofHidden Energy Costs May Force Major Policy Changes, CLEAN AIR REPORT,
Aug. 25, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 13311097 ("A sweeping study of the hidden costs
of energy use and production required by the new energy law could lead to re-appraisals
of a slew of federal environmental policies on global warming, oil spills, mercury emissions
and security for protecting energy facilities, according to sources familiar with the plan.").
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first step in dealing with an issue that will be central to energy policy for
the foreseeable future. °3
In the end, the Energy Policy Act does little to remove price dis-
tortions from the energy market. Unequal subsidies and tax breaks still
exist and no concrete steps have been taken to ensure that the energy
market accounts for the hidden environmental and social costs of fossil
fuels. With these price distortions still in place, renewable energy sources
will struggle to compete with traditional energy sources in the energy
market. As a result, the United States will struggle to address the envi-
ronmental concerns of the twenty-first century, including global warming.
D. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 and Increased Efficiency
By using energy more efficiently, the United States could reduce
the environmental harms of electricity generation by using less power.
President Bush claims "the [Energy Policy Act] makes an unprecedented
commitment to energy conservation and efficiency."3"4 The Act seeks to
improve efficiency mainly through tax incentives for energy efficient pro-
ducts and minimum efficiency standards for many consumer products
along with other smaller programs.3"5 Unprecedented or not, these pro-
grams, which are described in Part IV,3°6 do not seem extensive enough
to meaningfully improve the energy efficiency of the United States.30 '
The American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy ("ACEEE") esti-
mates that by 2010 the Act will only reduce the estimated energy con-
sumption by .6 percent.38 By 2020 the savings will jump to approximately
2 percent of the estimated energy use.3°9 Even with this jump in savings,
the ACEEE estimates that a more comprehensive energy bill could have
resulted in a four-fold increase in energy savings.310 As the ACEEE
303 See id.
o Bush, supra note 3.305 See generally NADEL, supra note 199.
3 See supra Part IV.
3 7 See supra Part IV; Hearing on the Energy Policy Act of 2005 Before the Subcomm. On
Energy and Air Quality of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. (2005)
(statement of David Hamilton, Director, Global Warming and Energy Programs, Sierra
Club), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/02162005hearing1437
/Hamilton.pdf.3 8 NADEL, supra note 199, at 15.3
09 Id. at 15.310 Id. at 17.
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concludes, the Act "only takes modest steps to promote efficiency and
leaves the biggest energy-saving items... on the table."31'
E. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 and Smart Grid Technology
In August of 2003, a large blackout cut power to much of the
Northeast and resulted in economic losses of nearly $6 billion.312 While
exact causes of the blackout are hard to pinpoint, an overburdened electric
grid coupled with an inability to keep failures from spreading played a
not insignificant role.313 To protect against another electrical disruption,
the United States needs to upgrade its electric grid.314 Such an upgrade
should consist of a small increase in transmission capacity along with an
investment in Smart Grid technologies that would improve communi-
cations, sensor and monitoring capabilities, and information sharing. 315
With more transmission capacity and an improved ability to monitor and
control the grid, the United States should be able to avoid another serious
disruption in its electrical transmission system. The question remains,
does the Energy Policy Act of 2005 carry out the necessary upgrades?
President Bush stated, "[w]ith this bill, America can start build-
ing a modern twenty-first century electricity grid .... "3 1 6 To support
that claim, the Act facilitates the expansion of the grid's transmission
capability." 7 If a certain geographic area suffers from transmission
congestion, the Act allows the Department of Energy to authorize the
construction or modification of the transmission facilities in that area.
The Department of Energy must first ascertain that certain requirements
are met to exercise this authority.3 9 However, the requirements are not
too stringent and will likely be met in most cases.32 ° In this manner the
311 Id. at 16.
312 See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
313 TOM DUTzIK& ROB SARGENT, ENVIRONMENT COLORADO, AFrER THE BLACKOUT: ACHEVING
A CLEANER, MORE RELIABLE ELECTRIC SYSTEM 4-5 (2003), httpJ/www.environmentcolorado
.org/reports/after the blackout03.pdf.
314 Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 8, at 525.
315 Id.; DUTzIK & SARGENT, supra note 313, at 15-16.
316 Bush, supra note 3.
317 Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 1221-24.
318 Id. § 1221.
319 Id.
121 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 amends Part II of the Federal Power Act so that FERC
is authorized, after notice and an opportunity for comment, to issue permits for the con-
struction or modification of transmission facilities in a national interest electric transmission
corridor if they find that:
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Act addresses the need to add transmission capacity. The next question
is whether the Act also addresses the need to incorporate Smart Grid
technologies into the grid as well.
The Act encourages and subsidizes advanced grid technology
investments by utilities, but does not require FERC or the Department of
Energy to implement such technologies.32' However, the Act did require
a report to study "the feasibility of real-time information on functional
status of transmission lines in the Eastern and Western Interconnec-
tions. 322 The Department of Energy and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission filed this report in Congress on February 3, 2006.323 In this
(1)(A) a state in which the transmission facilities are to be constructed
or modified does not have authority to:
(i) approve the siting of the facilities; or
(ii) consider the interstate benefits expected to be achieved by the pro-
posed construction or modification of transmission facilities in the State;
(B) the applicant for a permit is a transmitting utility under this Act
but does not qualify to apply for a permit or siting approval for the pro-
posed project in a State because the applicant does not serve end-use
customers in the State; or
(C) a State commission or other entity that has authority to approve
the siting of the facilities has:
(i) withheld approval for more than 1 year after the filing of an
application.., or 1 year after the designation of the relevant national
interest electric transmission corridor, whichever is later; or
(ii) conditioned its approval in such a manner that the proposed con-
struction or modification will not significantly reduce transmission
congestion in interstate commerce or is not economically feasible;
(2) the facilities to be authorized by the permit will be used for the
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce;
(3) the proposed construction or modification is consistent with the
public interest;
(4) the proposed construction or modification will significantly reduce
transmission congestion in interstate commerce and protects or bene-
fits consumers;
(5) the proposed construction or modification is consistent with sound
national energy policy and will enhance energy independence; and
(6) the proposed modification will maximize, to the extent reasonable and
economical, the transmission capacity of existing towers or structures.
Id. § 1221(a).
321 Id. §§ 1223-24.
322 Id. § 1839; EDISON ELECTRIC INST., ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005: SUMMARY OF TITLE
XII-ELECTRICITY, TITLE XVIII-STUDIES, AND RELATED PROVISIONS 21 (2005),
www.eei.org/industry-issues/electricity-policy/federal-legislation/summary-title -xii.pdf.
323 U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY & FED. ENERGY REG. COMM., STEPS To ESTABLISH A REAL-TIME
TRANSMISSION MONITORING SYSTEM FOR TRANSMISSION OWNERS AND OPERATORS WITHIN THE
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report, they concluded that the "technology currently exists that could be
used to establish a real-time transmission monitoring system to improve
the reliability of the nation's bulk power system; and emerging technolo-
gies hold the promise of greatly enhancing transmission system integrity
and operator situational awareness, thereby reducing the possibility of
regional and inter-regional blackouts."324 Given that such a real-time
monitoring system is possible, the DOE and FERC also gave nine steps for
determining the scope of a possible program and two steps to make its
implementation possible.325 Congress must now decide whether to pursue
implementing a real-time monitoring system to go along with the
transmission expansion it authorized. Considering the inclusion of this
report, along with the expansion of transmission capacity in the Energy
Policy Act, the initial signs are encouraging. However, final judgment
EASTERN AND WESTERN INTERCONNECTIONS (2006), http://www.oe.energy.gov/Documents
andMedia/final_1839.pdf.
324 Id. at 2.325 Id. at 8-9, 24.
The following nine steps should be taken if an interconnection-wide
real-time monitoring system is to be pursued:
Step 1. Define what a real-time monitoring system is, what it should
accomplish, and how to accomplish this goal, including an explanation
of the terms "real-time information" and "functional status."
Step 2. Evaluate existing real-time monitoring technologies and their
limitations.
Step 3. Identify the communications infrastructure required and related
security and operating issues.
Step 4. Define data requirements.
Step 5. Identify promising emerging technologies.
Step 6. Decide what data should be shared, with whom, and when.
Step 7. Decide who should operate, use, and maintain the system.
Step 8. Identify potential participants involved in establishing a real-
time monitoring system.
Step 9. Consider cost and funding issues.
Id. at 8-9.
DOE and the Commission have identified two steps that could be
followed if an interconnection-wide real-time monitoring system is to be
implemented.
Step 1. Research and study efforts to determine feasibility, cost, and
benefits of a real-time transmission monitoring system for the Eastern
and Western Interconnections.
Step 2. Based on the findings from Step 1 above, possible development
of real-time monitoring system reliability standards.
Id. at 24.
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must wait until it is known whether Congress will implement the smart
grid technology recommendations given to them by the DOE and FERC.
F. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 and Uniform Deregulation
As economists have realized that electricity generation is not a
natural monopoly, a need for and a movement towards its deregulation
has grown. 321 At the moment, however, this movement has resulted in a
very disorganized energy market. 7 Unfortunately, a disorganized sys-
tem of deregulation gives consumers no more economic advantage than
did the previous, highly regulated system.3 2' To remedy this situation,
Congress needs to give FERC the authority to implement its RTO based
plan of nationwide deregulation. 329 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 gave
no such authority.
The largest step the Act takes towards implementing a uniform
system of deregulation comes in the form of establishing a taskforce to
study "competition within the wholesale and retail market for electric
energy."3 ° This taskforce, drawn from the Department of Justice, FERC,
the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Energy, and the Rural
Utilities Service, must submit its final report within one year of the
enactment of the Act, which occurred on August 8, 2006. 331 While a final
judgment cannot be made until the taskforce submits its report, prelimi-
nary indications suggest that the taskforce will submit a pro-competition
report.332 According to a FERC press release, the taskforce "will analyze
critical elements for effective wholesale and retail competition, the status
of each element, impediments to realizing each element and suggestions
for overcoming impediments .,3 This language has led to the assumption
that the taskforce is approaching its task with a pro-competition state of
32 See supra notes 59-70, 116-31 and accompanying text.
311 See supra notes 59-70, 116-31 and accompanying text.
321 See supra notes 59-70, 116-31 and accompanying text.
... See supra notes 59-70, 116-31 and accompanying text.
330 Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1815.
331 Id.
" See Press Release, Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, Interagency Task Force Seeks Input for
Power Market Study (Oct. 19, 2005), http://www.ferc.gov/press-room/
press-releases/2005/2005-410-19-05.asp#skipnavsub.
333 Id.
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mind.334 If the taskforce does deliver a pro-competition report, Congress
will have before it a recommendation for a policy that is needed in the
emerging energy market. Whether Congress will have the political will
to implement such a recommendation remains to be seen.
G. Summary
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 continues the United States' tradi-
tional energy policies. Unfortunately, those policies will prove ineffective
in the twenty-first century. In the future the United States needs an
energy policy focused upon uniform deregulation, creating a "smart grid,"
developing an infrastructure and market for renewable energy, removing
the price distortions present in the energy market, and encouraging a
system of distributed generation. 35 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 did
not satisfy these needs. The Act instead delivered a policy that:
0 Encourages centralized generation without an effec-
tive plan for implementing distributed generation;
* Gives capital to renewable energy, but gives more
to traditional energy sources without creating a
market for renewable energy through a renewable
portfolio standard;
* Fails to remove price distortions from the energy
market;
* Takes half steps towards making the United States
more energy efficient;
* Provides a likely expansion of transmission capac-
ity with the possibility of implementing smart grid
technologies; and
* Studies deregulation while making no commitment
to its effectuation.
In short, Congress gave the people of the United States an unfocused
energy policy that does not address many of the concerns facing energy
markets in the twenty-first century.
'
3 Groups Worry of Pro-Competition Bias in Task Force Review of Power Markets, INSIDE
FERC, Nov. 28, 2005, at 11, available at 2005 WLNR 19951075.
335 See supra Part III.
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CONCLUSION
Where do the American people go from here? At present, they have
an energy policy that in the words of President Bush is "a first step toward
a more affordable and reliable energy future for the American citizens."336
Upon closer inspection, however, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 does
more to revive the past than it does to prepare for the future. According
to Congresswoman Rosa Delauro, "this bill proposes twentieth century
solutions for twenty-first century energy challenges."33' Given the Act's
inability to bring about the changes necessary for the twenty-first
century, the only sensible alternative seems to be to go back to the
drawing board and start over.
Next time, Congress should leave the past where it belongs-in
the past. Instead of a bill that protects the interests of traditional energy
producers, Congress should enact a bill focused solely on preparing the
United States for the energy challenges it will face in the new century.
The requirements of such a policy are well known and only when Congress
enacts them on a national level will the United States have an efficient,
secure, and environmentally friendly energy policy. Until that time the
United States' energy policy will remain trapped in the twentieth century.
336 Bush, supra note 3.
... 151 Cong. Rec. e1759-04 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2005) (statement of Rep. Delauro).
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